The Price of Friendship

Vietnamization was the policy of the Nixon administration to shift the burden of the Vietnam War from U.S. troops to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), allowing the United States to gradually withdraw its forces. This was a central component of the Nixon Doctrine, which aimed to reduce U.S. military commitments abroad and rely more on local allies to counter threats.

Evolution and Implementation

The policy evolved in response to increasing domestic anti-war sentiment, high U.S. casualties, and the recognition that a conventional military victory was unlikely. The main goal was to end the U.S. combat role without abandoning South Vietnam, thereby achieving "peace with honor."

Implementation involved several key actions:

• Troop Withdrawals: Beginning in 1969, the U.S. systematically pulled troops out of Vietnam.4 The number of American soldiers dropped from a peak of over 540,000 in 1969 to less than 30,000 by the end of 1972.

• Training and Equipping the ARVN: The U.S. provided extensive training, modern weaponry, and financial support to the South Vietnamese military, transforming it into a self-sufficient fighting force. This included supplying them with helicopters, tanks, and advanced artillery.

• "Secret" Air and Ground Campaigns: While U.S. ground troops were being withdrawn, the Nixon administration secretly expanded the war into neighboring Cambodia and Laos with heavy bombing campaigns and ground incursions. This was intended to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines (the Ho Chi Minh Trail) and buy time for the Vietnamization process to work.

• Diplomatic Engagement: The policy was coupled with diplomatic efforts, including negotiations with North Vietnam in Paris and the dramatic opening of relations with China. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger hoped that by improving ties with the Soviet Union and China, they could pressure these communist powers to reduce their support for North Vietnam.

The Failure of Vietnamization

Despite some initial success in building up the ARVN, the policy ultimately failed to prevent the fall of South Vietnam. The final collapse in 1975 demonstrated the limitations of the strategy.

• ARVN's Inherent Weakness: Despite U.S. training and equipment, the ARVN struggled with systemic problems, including low morale, corruption, and ineffective leadership. It was not able to handle the full-scale conventional assault from the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) once U.S. air and logistical support was removed.

• Dependence on U.S. Support: The ARVN's combat effectiveness was heavily reliant on U.S. air power and a massive logistical supply chain. When Congress cut funding for South Vietnam and the U.S. withdrew its air support, the ARVN's ability to fight was severely hampered.

• Political Factors: The Watergate scandal in the U.S. and Nixon's subsequent resignation in 1974 severely weakened the American government's ability to influence events and fulfill its promises to Saigon. This emboldened North Vietnam to launch its final offensive, knowing the U.S. was politically unable to intervene.

The U.S. Proxy War Strategy: Historical Context and Modern Application

The concept of "Vietnamization" is a prime example of a proxy war strategy, where a major power avoids direct, large-scale military confrontation by supporting a local combatant. This strategy became a hallmark of the Cold War, as the U.S. and the Soviet Union vied for global influence without risking direct conflict that could escalate to nuclear war.

• Historical Examples: The U.S. has a long history of this strategy. During the Cold War, it supported anti-communist forces in places like Afghanistan (the Mujahideen against the Soviets), Nicaragua (the Contras), and Angola. This allowed the U.S. to bleed its rivals while keeping its own casualties and financial costs relatively low.

• Post-9/11 Era: The strategy continued after 9/11. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. initially deployed large numbers of troops but later sought to hand off security responsibilities to local forces, similar to Vietnamization. The U.S. trained and equipped the Afghan National Army and Iraqi Security Forces, with mixed results. The rapid collapse of the Afghan army in 2021 after the U.S. withdrawal demonstrated a similar failure to the one in Vietnam.

• Current Geopolitical Landscape: Today, the U.S. continues to employ this strategy in its competition with rivals such as China and Russia. The U.S. and its allies are not directly fighting Russia in Ukraine but are providing substantial military and financial aid to the Ukrainian armed forces. Similarly, in the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. maintains a military presence and deepens its alliances with nations such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. These partnerships are intended to create a network of deterrence against a potential conflict with China, particularly over Taiwan. The U.S. is providing military assistance and technology to these allies, empowering them to defend themselves and potentially act as a buffer in a future conflict.

The core logic of this strategy is that it's more politically and economically sustainable for the U.S. to support others fighting its battles. However, as demonstrated by the failure of Vietnamization and the recent events in Afghanistan, this approach carries significant risks. It can lead to the collapse of allied governments, destabilization of entire regions, and a loss of U.S. credibility, which can undermine its long-term strategic goals.

U.S. Support for Saddam Hussein Against Iran

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) is a quintessential example of this policy. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States saw the new revolutionary government under Ayatollah Khomeini as a major threat to its interests in the Middle East, particularly to oil supplies and its allies in the Gulf. Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which was already an antagonistic neighbor to Iran, was seen as a potential counterweight.

Here's how U.S. support for Saddam unfolded:

• Initial Neutrality and a "Tilt": Although the U.S. initially adopted a public stance of neutrality, this quickly evolved into a "tilt" toward Iraq. The Reagan administration removed Iraq from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1982, opening the door for increased aid and a normalization of relations.

• Providing Intelligence and Financial Aid: The U.S. provided critical intelligence to Iraq, including satellite imagery of Iranian troop movements, which gave Saddam a significant tactical advantage. The U.S. also facilitated billions of dollars in loans and agricultural credits, which helped Iraq finance its war effort.

• Circumventing Arms Embargoes: While an official arms embargo was in place, the U.S. and its allies provided "dual-use" technology and equipment that could be used for both civilian and military purposes. This included helicopters, computers, and chemical precursors.

• Complicity in War Crimes: The most damning consequence of this policy was the U.S. looking the other way as Saddam used chemical weapons against Iranian troops and his own Kurdish population. U.S. intelligence was aware of these attacks, but the policy to prevent an Iranian victory took precedence.

The long-term fallout was immense. When Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. found itself in the position of fighting a former ally. The legacy of U.S. support for Saddam, and the subsequent interventions in the region, fueled anti-American sentiment and contributed to the instability that continues to plague the Middle East.

Systemic and Ideological Drivers

The pattern of the U.S. backing dictators is not a series of random mistakes. It's rooted in deep-seated elements of U.S. foreign policy:

• Realpolitik and the Cold War: During the Cold War, the overarching goal was the containment of communism. This often meant sacrificing democratic ideals for strategic expediency. Any leader, no matter how brutal, who was an avowed anti-communist was considered a viable partner. This led to the U.S. supporting dictators in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (e.g., Suharto in Indonesia, Pinochet in Chile, Marcos in the Philippines). The belief was that a stable, even if authoritarian, ally was preferable to a potentially communist-aligned or chaotic state.

• Economic Interests: American business interests have historically played a major role. Backing a friendly dictator often meant securing access to natural resources (especially oil), cheap labor, and favorable markets, all of which would be at risk if a popular, nationalist, or revolutionary movement came to power.

• Short-Term vs. Long-Term Thinking: This strategy is often driven by short-term crisis management. Policymakers focus on solving the immediate problem—like a perceived communist threat or a hostile regional power—without fully considering the long-term consequences of empowering an unstable and brutal regime. This is the "strategic sequencing" you mentioned, but it often leads to a cycle of intervention and blowback.

• Ideological Blind Spots: There has often been an ideological belief that American-style democracy can be "nation-built" in other countries, or that authoritarian leaders can be gradually reformed. This has led to a failure to understand local political dynamics and the deep-seated grievances that often fuel resistance to U.S.-backed regimes. The U.S. has often failed to see that a dictator's repression is a prime recruiting tool for the very groups they are trying to fight.

The Modern Dilemma

In the post-9/11 world, this strategy has proven far less effective. The U.S. is no longer fighting a single, monolithic enemy, such as the Soviet Union. The threats are more diffuse and often homegrown, a direct result of past U.S. interventions.

• Forever Wars: The strategy of "Vietnamization" in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the U.S. trained and equipped local forces, failed for many of the same reasons it did in Vietnam. The local forces lacked the legitimacy and morale to fight for a government perceived as corrupt or a puppet of an external power. The result has been a series of prolonged, inconclusive conflicts that the U.S. cannot "win" and cannot easily exit.

• Loss of Soft Power: Your point about the destruction of U.S. soft power is critical. The consistent support for dictators, the documented use of torture, and the perceived hypocrisy of promoting democracy while backing repressive regimes have severely damaged the U.S.'s image and moral standing on the world stage. This makes it more difficult to establish genuine alliances and garner international support for its policies.

• Syria and the Proliferation of Proxy Groups: In Syria, the U.S. has supported a variety of rebel groups against the Assad regime, often with a similar logic of empowering a local force. However, this has led to a chaotic and fractured conflict where U.S.-backed groups have sometimes fought against each other or had their weapons fall into the hands of extremist organizations. The situation is a microcosm of the systemic failures of the proxy war strategy.

The shift from direct military intervention to "strategic sequencing" and proxy wars reflects an institutional and political preference for lower U.S. casualty counts and reduced financial costs. However, as the historical record shows, this approach often creates power vacuums, empowers dangerous actors, and sets the stage for future conflicts, demonstrating that a strategy that appears "more profitable" in the short term can be catastrophically destructive in the long run.